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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NEIL TROTTA, * 
* Plaintiff/Appellant, * 
* 
v. 
* 
* Case No. 18237 THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, * 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, * 
* Defendant/Respondent. * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a review of a decision of the Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah finding that Appellant was 
discharged from his employment for actions which were deliberate, 
willful and wanton and adverse to his employer's rightful 
interests in accordance with §35-3-5 (b) (1), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended). 
DISPOSITIONS BELOW 
The Industrial Commission of Utah, through its Board of 
Review, reversed the previous decisions of the Department of 
Employment Security and its appeals referee, in making its 
finding. Appellant had been awarded unemployment compensation 
benefits upon application. The employer, the Fisher Company, 
appealed that award and a hearing was conducted. The appeals 
referee affirmed the initial award of benefits following which 
the employer appealed to the Board of Review. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks that the Court reverse Respondent's 
decision that Appellant acted in a manner which was deliberate, 
willful, and wanton and adverse to his employer's rightful 
interests and enter its judgment that Respondent's decision was 
not supported by substantial evidence and that Plaintiff is 
entitled as a matter of law to unemployment compensation benefits 
from November 14, 1981, until he is no longer otherwise eligible 
and that therefore as a matter of law unemployment compensation 
benefits received by Appellant for the calendar weeks November 
14, 1981, through December 5, 1981, and for the calendar weeks 
December 12, 1981, through January 20, 1982, were not 
overpayments. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are undisputed. Additional facts 
will be referred to in the text of the argument. 
Appellant Neil Trotta was a former employee of the 
Fisher Company. (R.24) On August 12, 1981, he was rehired as a 
fiberglass laminator. (R.23) He was rehired because of his good 
record with the company and his good relationship and bond with 
the employer. (R.24) From August 12, 1981, to October 15, 1981, 
Mr. Trotta worked without any absences and without receiving any 
notice that his job performance was not satisfactory. (R.29) On 
Friday, October 16, 1981, Fisher Company allowed all of its 
employees to take the day off so that they might go deer hunting. 
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{R. 23) Even though Mr. Trotta was not feeling well he took 
advantage of the opportunity and went hunting. (R.21, 39) 
On the following Monday and Tuesday, October 19, and 20, 
1981, Mr. Trotta was absent from work. (R.21,39) Mr. Trotta 
returned to work on Wednesday, October 21, 1981. {R.25) Upon his 
return, his employer, Mr. Fisher, inquired about his heal th. 
{R.25, 23) Mr. Trotta responded that he was not feeling great 
but would try to make it through the rest of the week. (R.25) 
There were no further discussions about Mr. Trotta' s heal th or 
absences until October 29, 1981. 
said about the sufficiency or 
( R. 2 9 , 2 4 ) Nor 
insufficiency of 
was 
Mr. 
anything 
Trotta's 
notification of those absences. (R.29,24) The employer was not 
contemplating discharging Mr. Trotta at that time. {R. 24) Mr. 
Trotta worked the rest of the week even though he felt sick. 
(R.30) His sickness lasted over the weekend and into the 
following Monday, October 26. (R.25, 30} Nevertheless, he worked 
10 1/2 hours on that day. (R. 27) On Tuesday and Wednesday, 
October 27 and 28, 1981, Mr. Trotta was absent again. (R.21, 39) 
When Mr. Trotta returned to work on Thursday, October 29, he was 
discharged. (R.21, 39) He was told that he was being discharged 
so that an example might be made of him. (R.21, 39, 28) 
After his discharge, Mr. Trotta applied for and was 
awarded unemployment insurance compensation benefits by the 
Department of Employment Security. {R.21, 39) The employer 
appealed the award. (R.35, 36) After a hearing before an appeals 
-3-
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referee the award was upheld. (R.17, 18, 19) The employer 
appealed again to the State Industrial Commission's Board of 
Review. (R.16) The three member Board of Review reversed the 
referee's decision with one member dissenting. (R.7, 8, 9) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
MR. TROTTA WAS NOT DISCHARGED FOR AN ACT OR 
OMISSION WHICH WAS DELIBERATE, WILLFUL, OR 
WANTON AND ADVERSE TO HIS EMPLOYER'S RIGHTFUL 
INTEREST. 
An employer has the legal right to discharge an 
employee for any cause or even without cause. Turner v. Brown, 
134 So.2d 384, 386 (La. 1961). However, there is a sharp legal 
distinction between cause for discharge and willful misconduct 
which bars unemployment compensation benefits. Grace v. 
Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 412 A.2d 
1128, 1130 (Pa. 1980) . Under Utah law "misconduct" which bars 
unemployment compensation benefits must be an "act or omission in 
connection with employment, not constituting a crime, which is 
deliberate, willful, or wanton, and adverse to the employer's 
rightful interest. " Utah Code Ann . (1953, as amended) 
§35-4-5(b) (1). Under misconduct standards similar to Utah's the 
courts have generally held that the employer has the burden of 
proving that an employee was discharged for misconduct and that 
misconduct was of sufficient severity to make the employee 
ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Wheeler v. 
Department of Employment Security, 421 A.2d 1315, 1316 (Vt. 
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1980); Giese v. Employment Division, 557 P.2d 1354, 1356 (Or. 
1976); Coulter v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation's Board 
of Review, 332 A.2d 876, 879 (Pa. 1975); Tundel v. Commonwealth 
Unemployment Compensation's Board of Review, 404 A. 2d 434, 435 
(Pa. 1979) i and Hawkins v. District Unemployment Compensation 
Board, 381 A.2d 619, 621 (D.C. 1977). 
A. Going Deer Hunting While Sick With the Flu is 
Not Misconduct Within the Meaning of the Law. 
Evidence indicates that Mr. Trotta had the flu from 
Friday, October 16, 1981, through Wednesday, October 28, 1981. 
(R.40, 30) No evidence introduced by the employer refutes this 
or is directed toward refuting this fact. The only evidence 
given by the employer which might be taken as contrary to this 
was that the employer believed that Mr. Trotta had gone deer 
hunting on October 20. (R.23) But even if Mr. Trotta had gone 
hunting on the 20th, a fact which he has consistently denied 
(R.25, 26), it does not follow that he was not also ill on that 
day. Mr. Trotta introduced evidence that he went hunting on the 
first day of the hunt even though he was ill. (R.21, 39) Mr. 
Trotta could have gone hunting in a manner which would not have 
greatly taxed him. Thus a mere showing that he did go hunting 
would not negate the fact that he was still too ill to justify 
going to work. And even had Mr. Trotta gone hunting in a manner 
which could have aggravated his illness, this would not be 
determinative of whether or not he was entitled to unemployment 
compensation benefits. 
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The employer based his belief that Mr. Trotta had gone 
hunting on October 20 on information received from another 
employee, Jack Gardner. ( R. 2 3) Mr. Gardner is a high school 
student who occasionally works for the Fisher Company after 
school at night. (R.32) At Mr. Trotta's unemployment hearing the 
employer's representative, Mrs. Fisher, testified that Mr. 
Gardner had called in on October 20 and had asked for the day off 
to go hunting with Mr. Trotta. (R.23) Mrs. Fisher then 
introduced a notarized statement signed by Mr. Gardner that he 
had gone hunting with Mr. Trotta. (R.23) However, Mr. Gardner 
was not present at the hearing to verify this hearsay statement. 
The notarized statement stated November 20 as the day on which 
Mr. Gardner went hunting with Mr. Trotta, not October 20. (R.23) 
Further, the statement was dated December 8, 1981, which was over 
a month and a half after Mr. Gardner was supposed to have gone 
hunting. Because of the error, the lapse in time, and Mr. 
Gardner's failure to testify, this evidence is insufficient. 
However, even if the employer had proven that Mr. Trotta had gone 
deer hunting on October 20, this would not amount to misconduct 
such as to justify denying him unemployment compensation 
benefits. 
In Eagan v. Philips, 431 N.Y.S.2d. 731, 784, D.2d 564 
(App. Div. 1980), an employee whose job required lifting auto 
parts weighing 15 pounds or more onto a conveyor belt, injured 
her arm on the job. Her physicians recommended that she take her 
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two weeks vacation and ask her employer for an extra week as sick 
leave so that her arm could properly heal. Her employer agreed. 
On the first week away from work, the employee participated in a 
softball game which she was watching. She was dismissed and the 
New York Unemployment Insurance Board determined that her actions 
were misconduct and denied her unemployment compensation 
benefits. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court 
reversed. The court found that the claimant's spontaneous 
decision, given the purpose of her leave, was an error in 
judgment, but it was not intended to injure her employer's 
interest and was therefore not misconduct such as would defeat 
her claim for unemployment compen3ation benefits. The claimant 
in Eagan had an injury which could be aggravated by playing 
softball. If she aggravated her injury further, more time off 
would be required for it to heal. This would be detrimental to 
her employer's interest. But the decision to play softball was 
not made with the intention of harming the employer's interest. 
It was poor judgment but was not misconduct. 
Mr. Trotta was sick with the flu which could possibly 
have been aggravated by going deer hunting. This may have 
resulted in more absences. This would be detrimental to his 
employer's interest. But there is no evidence that any decision 
by Mr. Trotta to go hunting was made with the intention of 
harming the employer's interest. Going hunting may have 
demonstrated poor judgment, but by a mere showing that Mr. Trotta 
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had gone deer hunting the employer would not meet the burden of 
proving that Mr. Trotta had committed a deliberate, willful, or 
wanton act adverse to the employer's interest. 
B. Appellant Did Not Break Any Company Policies 
Regarding Absences From Work. 
Because the employer cannot meet the burden of proving 
misconduct by merely showing that Mr. Trotta went deer hunting on 
October 20, he must prove that other actions by Mr. Trotta 
amounted to misconduct and that the employer in fact dismissed 
Mr. Trotta for these other actions. See Coulter v. Commonwealth 
Unemployment Board of Review, 332 A. 2d 876 (Pa. 1975). The 
claimant in Coulter was a truck driver. The referee board had 
found that Coulter was dismissed for (1) reclining in his truck 
during working hours with his shoes off and both doors open, (2) 
failing to keep his truck clean, and (3) damaging his truck by 
hitting a curb of a bridge. The Court held that reclining in his 
truck was not misconduct which would deny Coulter unemployment 
compensation benefits. The court could find no specific rule 
against such behavior. Nor could the employer be found to have 
really considered Coulter' s action to be misconduct at the time 
he saw it. At no time was Coulter reprimanded or questioned 
concerning the propriety of his action until after he had wrecked 
his truck sometime later and had been dismissed. As to the 
charge that the employee had failed to keep his truck clean, the 
employer failed to demonstrate any set standard or rule for 
keeping the truck clean. Furthermore, the employer did not 
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reveal in what way the truck was unclean. The Pennsylvania court 
held that a general statement that the employee failed to keep 
his truck clean was not sufficient to prove misconduct. The 
court further held that the employee's dismissal for failing to 
negotiate a turn onto a bridge was not willful misconduct. This 
was merely a single act of negligence or carelessness and did not 
constitute willful misconduct. 
While the employer in Coulter was aware that the 
employee had been riding on company time, there was no rule or 
policy, written or otherwise, against doing so. Mr. Trotta' s 
employer submitted evidence that any employee could have time off 
for any reason even if it was inconvenient for the employer. 
(R.23) Thus, the Fisher Company had no rule or policy, written 
or otherwise, which restricted the types of reasons for which an 
employee could take a day off. 
Next, the employer in Coulter had failed at any time to 
mention, question, or reprimand the employee for reclining on the 
job. After Mr. Trotta' s return to work on October 21, his 
employer inquired about his heal th. (R. 25, 23) But at no time 
did the employer mention, question, or reprimand Mr. Trotta for 
having been absent on October 19 and 20. In Coulter, the first 
time that the incident of the employee reclining was mentioned 
was after he had been dismissed following the· truck accident. 
Similarly, the Fisher Company never alleged any kind of 
misconduct by Mr. Trotta until after he had been dismissed 
following his October 27 and 28 absences. 
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Fin ally, the employer in Coulter admitted that the 
employee's conduct of reclining on work time would not have 
resulted in dismissal. Id. at 878. Mr. Trotta's employer 
testified at his unemployment hearing that there was no 
contemplation to dismiss Mr. Trotta following his return to work 
on October 21. (R. 24) Thus, under the Coulter standard, the 
employer has failed to meet his burden of proving that Mr. Trotta 
was dismissed for misconduct due to his being absent on October 
19 and 20. 
c. Failure to Work Overtime Was Not the Reason for 
Firing Trotta, Nor Would it Have Been 
Misconduct. 
The Fisher Company also complainted that Mr. Trotta 
refused to make up his absences by working on the weekend. (R.31) 
Mr. Trotta denies ever having been asked to do so and further, 
: ~ 
denies that he refused to work overtime. (R.25) There was no set 
policy requiring the employee to make up the day for which he had 
been absent. Nor did the employer mention, question, or 
reprimand Mr. Trotta for not having worked on the weekend. 
Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that until Mr. Trotta's 
absences on October 27 and 28, 1981, the employer had planned on 
dismissing Mr. Trotta for not having worked on the weekend. 
Thus, under the Coulter standard, the employer failed to meet his 
burden of proving that Mr. Trotta was fired for not having worked 
on the weekend and that such conduct would be sufficient to deny 
Mr. Trotta unemployment compensation benefits. 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The employer further alleged that Mr. Trotta refused to 
work any overtime. (R. 22, 38) Yet Mr. Trotta introduced check 
stubs showing that he had worked overtime. (R.13) The employer's 
records show that on Mr. Trotta's last day of work he worked 10 
1/2 hours. (R.27) This was 2 1/2 hours more than his shift 
required. (R.29) The prior week he had worked 26 hours in three 
days for 2 hours overtime. (R.31) Once again, the employer never 
mentioned, questioned, or reprimanded Mr. Trotta for not working 
sufficient overtime. (R.29) The employer even admitted that the 
employees could put in as much overtime as they desired. (R.23) 
Lastly, the employer advised the hearing examiner that, "We never 
require anyone to put in overtime and we never fire anyone for 
refusing to put in overtime." (R.32) 
Because the employer did not at anytime mention, 
question, or reprimand Mr. Trotta about his overtime, and because 
there was no policy requiring anyone to put in any overtime nor 
would an employee be dismissed for refusing to put in overtime, 
the employer has failed to meet his burden of proving that Mr. 
Trotta engaged in any willful misconduct in connection with the 
adequacy of his overtime that would establish grounds for denying 
him unemployment compensation benefits. 
-11-
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D. Appellant's Job Performance Was Not the Reason 
Nor Did it Arise to the Level of Misconduct. 
The Fisher Company alleged that Mr. Trotta's job 
performance had been unsatisfactory prior to his first absence on 
October 19. (R.22, 38) Yet even if true, this is not misconduct. 
In Coulter, supra, the employer gave as one of the reasons for 
dismissing the employee that the employee failed to keep his 
truck clean. The court found that the employer had no policy 
regarding keeping trucks clean and further that the employer had 
never indicated in what way the truck was unclean. The court 
held that the employer had not met his burden of proof with 
abroad assertion that the truck was unclean. Id. at 878, 879. 
Mr. Trotta's employer at no time informed him that his 
work was unsatisfactory (R29). Further, as in Coulter, there 
were no work evaluations or other standards that would indicate 
in what manner hiw performance was lacking. As was found in 
Coulter, a broad assertion of unsatisfactory behavior does not 
meet the employer's burden of provins misconduct. 
E. Appellant Did Not Fail to Notify His Employer of 
His Absences. 
The employer alleged that Mr. Trotta had failed to give 
proper notice of his absences as required by company policy. 
(R.36) According to the employer, Mr. Trotta failed to call in 
personally on each day that he was absent. (R. 36) Instead, 
according to the employer, his wife called in on October 20 and 
again on October 28 and stated that Mr. Trotta was home sick. 
- 1 ') _ 
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(R.35, 36) At the hearing, Mrs. Fisher testified that there were 
no written formal procedures for giving notice. (R.24) The only 
requirement was that an employee inform the employer as soon as 
possible and advise them of the reason for the absence. (R. 24) 
Mrs. Fisher testified that employees called in to the shop to 
report their absences and that anyone there could answer the 
telephone. (R. 31) The employer placed the responsibility for 
knowing that someone had called in on the shop foreman. ( R. 31) 
Mr. Trotta testified that the foreman usually did not answer the 
telephone when someone called in. (R.30) Therefore it would have 
to have been up to the employee answering the telephone to relay 
a co-worker's message that he would be absent. While Mrs. Fisher 
testified that all production employees report to the supervisor, 
(R.31) they only have record of having received calls on October 
20 and 28. (R.23) Yet the Trottas testified that they had called 
in on every absence. (R.25) It is certainly possible that the 
foreman may not always be available for calls. This was the case 
when the Department of Employment Security attempted to call him 
on November 9, 1981. (R.22, 38) There apparently is no company 
practice that would insure that all messages will be relayed to 
the foreman. 
A similar situation arose in Penn Photomats 
Incorporated v. Commonweal th Compensation Board of Review, 417 
A. 2d 1311 (Pa. 1980). The employer in Penn Photomats had a 
formal written policy concerning the required notice. This 
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policy was posted throughout the employer's plant. It required 
the absent employee to contact the office by 9: 00 a .m. on the 
first day out. The claimant did not contact the office but 
instead called co-workers in a different building to inform them 
that she would not be in and to have them relay the message. The 
plant manager failed to receive the message and the claimant was 
discharged for unexcused absences. The court found that neither 
claimant nor other employees had been reprimanded in the past for 
calling in their absences to co-workers in their own building. 
Penn Photomats admitted that this procedure was acceptable. 
Therefore the court sustained the Board of Review's conclusion 
that even though such messages were not relayed to the main 
off ice the claimant had given notice and her conduct in following 
the less formal procedure was not willful misconduct for which 
unemployment compensation benefits would be denied. 
The Fisher Company did not have a written formal 
procedure. {R. 24) Thus there would be even less justification 
for finding that Mr. Trotta violated a known policy than in Penn 
Photomats. The Fisher Company testified that the policy required 
employees to "report in." {R.24) As in Penn Photomat, not all 
of the calls from Mr. and Mrs. Trotta were logged. {R.23) But 
Mr. Trotta was not reprimanded after having once followed the 
accepted procedure for notification. Therefore under the Penn 
Photomat standard he gave notice and the employer has to meet his 
burden of proving that Mr. Trotta failed to give notice and that 
-14-
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if he had not called in, that such failure was the result of a 
deliberate, willful or wanton act by Mr. Trotta for which he 
would be denied unemployment compensation benefits. 
F. Appellant's Absences Were Not Misconduct Under 
the Januzik Standard. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that dismissal for 
excessive absenteeism may be misconduct which will make the 
claimant ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. 
Januzik v. Department of Employment Security and Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 569 P.2d 1112 (Utah, 1977). 
But Januzik is clearly distinguishable in that the claimant in 
Januzik received a written warning prior to his dismissal that he 
would be discharged should he have any more absences. Id. at 
1113. The claimant in Januzik was not dismissed after being 
absent due to illness but rather for not coming into work at all 
after calling and stating that he would be an hour late because 
of car problems. Id. at 1113. This lack of prior notice is a 
critical defect in the Respondent's case, for without it, 
misconduct cannot be found. As discussed above, the Fisher 
Company failed to prove that Trotta's notice was inadequate nor 
that he was not ill. 
The record does not show that Mr. Trotta was dismissed 
for going deer hunting. While the employer testified that no 
notice of Mr. Trotta's absence on October 27 was received, (R.23) 
Mr. Trotta denies this. (R.21, 39, 25, 27, 30). No other 
evidence was introduced by the employer concerning Mr. Trotta's 
, c:._ 
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activities on the 27th and 28th. Therefore at the 
Trotta was dismissed the employer could not have 
time Mr. 
based a 
dismissal for Mr. Trotta' s October 27 and 28 absences on any 
other grounds than that Mr. Trotta was absent due to illness. 
In Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Blouse, 
350 A. 2d 220 (Pa. 1976) , the court found that where there is 
proper notice, absences for illness are not misconduct. In 
Blouse the claimant had a long history of absences close to 
weekends for which she had been given warnings. There was a 
question as to whether she had been ill or not but the court 
upheld the Board of Review's finding of illness and upheld the 
award of unemployment compensation benefits. The court found 
sufficient notice by claimant on her days off and held that 
illness with sufficient notice is never misconduct. 
As there was no proof that Mr. Trotta had not been ill 
on October 27 and 28 at the time of his dismissal, it could not 
have been made on the basis of misconduct. 
Mr. Trotta testified at his hearing that on October 27 
he had been deer hunting. (R.26) However, the employer had no 
knowledge of this until the date of the hearing, which was 
approximately one and one half months after Mr. Trotta's 
dismissal. The Utah Supreme Court has held that evidence 
presented at an unemployment hearing which had not been 
discovered until approximately one and one half months after a 
claimants' dismissal could not be considered as evidence to 
-16-
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support the reason for termination. Continental Oil company v. 
Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 558 P.2d 727, 729 (Utah 
1977). Thus the hunt~ng incident cannot be considered as 
evidence to support the employer's reason for dismissing Mr. 
Trotta. 
In conclusion Mr. Trotta has shown that he was 
basically a good employee and had no problem with his employer 
until October, 1981. On October 16 he was given the day off to 
go deer hunting, and went even though he was ill. Over the next 
two weeks he missed four days of work because of his continuing 
illness. This was the first time that he had been absent since 
beginning work on August 12, 1981. On one of his days off he 
also went deer hunting. He did not inform his employer of having 
done so. However it was his employer's belief that Mr. Trotta 
had gone deer hunting. Nevertheless, his employer at no time 
prior to the day of Mr. Trotta's dismissal said anything that in 
any way would indicate dissatisfaction with his job performance 
or absenteeism. At the time Mr. Trotta was dismissed he was told 
that he was being dismissed to set an example. The employer had 
the burden of proving that Mr. Trotta was dismissed for an act 
which was deliberate, willful, or wanton, or adverse to the 
employer's rightful interest. By failing to indicate his 
dissatisfaction with Mr. Trotta's actions prior to Mr. Trotta's 
dismissal, the employer failed to meet his burden. Mr. Trotta is 
therefore entitled to unemployment compensation benefits as a 
matter of law. 
-17-
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POINT II. 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DETERMINATION IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IS 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
The role of the Utah Supreme Court under Section 
35-4-lO(i) of the Utah Employment Security Act is to: 
[S]ustain the determination of the Board 
of Review, unless the record clearly and 
persuasively proves the action of the Board 
was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. 
Specifically, as a matter of law, the 
determination was wrong; because only the 
opposite conclusion could be drawn from the 
facts. 
Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission, 568 P.2d 727, 729-30 (Utah 1977). 
A majority of a three member Board of Review disallowed 
Mr. Trotta benefits. The majority based it's decision on the 
fact that while Mr. Trotta had been aware that his employer was 
busy he nevertheless went deer hunting on the 27th of October and 
only gave notice of this absence by having his wife call in for 
him. As demonstrated above, the fact that Mr. Trotta went deer 
hunting on the 27th cannot be considered as evidence to support 
the reason for his termination. And a Board of Review "may not 
in its findings rely on reasons for discharge that were not 
considered relevant by the employer." Tundel v. Commonweal th 
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 404 A.2d 434, 435 (Pa. 
1979). In Tundel the Board of Review had considered evidence of 
the claimant's unexcused absences as support for its conclusion 
of willful misconduct. But, while the claimant had had unexcused 
-18-
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absences in March and April for which he had been given a warning 
and suspension, the employer had dismissed him for falling 
asleep, watching television and eating on the job, and occasional 
tardiness. The court held that for the Board to have relied on 
reasons which the employer had not considered relevant was error. 
Id. at 435. Until it was disclosed at Mr. Trotta's unemployment 
hearing, Mr. Trotta's employer was not aware that Mr. Trotta had 
gone deer hunting on October 27, 1981. The employer did not rely 
on this as a reason for Mr. Trotta' s dismissal. Thus, under 
Tundel it was error for the Board to consider it to support its 
conclusions of willful misconduct. 
The Board's reliance on the sufficiency of Mr. Trotta's 
notice to his employer was also error. Mr. Trotta followed an 
accepted procedure for giving such notice. By law the manner in 
which Mr. Trotta gave notice was not misconduct. The fact that 
Mr. Trotta knew that his employer was busy on the 27th when he 
went hunting does not misconduct. The employer's policy 
regarding absences was _that anyone could take a day off for 
almost any reason even when it was inconvenient to the employer. 
(R.23) Furthermore, the employer did not dismiss Mr. Trotta for 
having gone deer hunting on the 27th. Therefore going hunting on 
the 27th cannot be relied on by the Board to justify its finding 
of misconduct. As the Utah Supreme Court found in Continental 
Oil Company, supra, even though "conduct may be harmful to the 
employer's interest and justify the employee's discharge; 
-19-
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nevertheless it evokes the disqualifications for unemployment 
benefits only if it is willful, wanton, or equally culpable." 
568 P. 2d 727, 731 (Utah 1977). See also Jacobs v. California 
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 25 Cal.App. 1035, 102 Cal. 
Rptr. 364. For a general discussion of the law see 26 A.L.R. 3d 
1356. Going deer hunting while sick with the flu was not an 
action directed towards the employer. This may have been poor 
judgment but it is not misconduct. 
Finally, the Review Board majority noted that Mr. 
Trotta noted on his Statement of Reason for Quit or Discharge 
that he was ill on the 27th. (R.39) The majority inferred that 
this statement was not credible in as much as Mr. Trotta 
testified at his hearing that he had gone deer hunting on that 
day. Here again the Board committed error in using evidence as 
part of its conclusion which could not have been and was not 
relied upon by the employer in the dismissal. Mr. Trotta has 
consistently maintained that he was ill and even though he may 
have used poor judgment in also going deer hunting, this was not 
misconduct. Indeed, the form asks for reasons for discharge. No 
evidence has been introduced showing that the employer informed 
Mr. Trotta prior to filling out this form that he was being 
discharged for any other reason than to be made an example of. 
(R.29, 28) This reason was given by Mr. Trotta as the reason for 
discharge along with what he presumed to be his employer's 
justification, that is, that he had been absent due to illness on 
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October 19, 20, 27, and 28. At the time Mr. Trotta filled out 
this form nothing had at any time been said to him in the way of 
informing him that his employer was dismissing him for having 
gone deer hunting on a day when he was home sick with the flu. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the employer did not meet its burden of proving 
that Mr. Trotta's dismissal was due to an act or omission which 
was deliberate, willful, or wanton, and adverse to the employer's 
rightful interest it was error for the Board of Review to 
disallow unemployment compensation benefits. The Board relied 
upon evidence which had not been the basis for Mr. Trotta' s 
dismissal. Thus to rely upon it in their decision was arbitrary, 
capricious and unreasonable. As a matter of law the Board's 
determination was in error because only the opposite conclusion 
can be drawn from the facts. This conclusion is expressed quite 
succinctly by the dissenting member of the Board of Review: 
It is evident from the record that whether the 
claimant actually went hunting with his fell ow 
worker on October 20 or October 27, the fact 
remains that the employer believed that he had 
gone hunting on October 20, a day which he had 
reported in ill. In spite of what the employer 
believed to be a lie by the claimant, the 
employer allowed the claimant to return to work 
on October 21, 22, and 23, thus apparently 
choosing not to terminate the claimant as a 
result of what the employer believed to be his 
dishonesty in reporting in ill when he was deer 
hunting. It was only the following week after 
the claimant was absent an additional two days, 
that claimant was terminated. Prior to the 
claimant's admission that he had gone deer 
hunting on October 27, the employer had no 
reason to believe but what he was ill for those 
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two days, which would have been a matter beyond 
the claimant's control therefore, it appears 
that the employer terminated the claimant to 
make an example out of him to the other 
employees and at his own convenience. (R.9) 
DATED this '2 (o.._,L day of April, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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